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TANZANIA AND THE IMF: BOUND FIVE*
1979 In Historic Context
The breakdown of Tanzania's 1979 negotiations with the International 
Monetary Fund, the consequential resignation of Minister of 
Finance Mtei and President Nyerere's New Year speech to the 
Diplomatic Corps attacking the IMF for political and 
ideologically based manipulation attracted substantial 
publicity. Somewhat ironically, subsequent events culminating 
in 1980/81 - 1981/82 Compensatory Facility and Standby (Higher 
Credit Tranche and Witteveen Facilities) totalling about £100 
million have passed virtually unnoticed except in Tanzania.
What has happened? Has Tanzania done a U-turn? Has the IMF?
Are Tanzania/IMF relations now on a harmonious course or are 
the September 1980 agreements only a truce?
The history of Tanzania - IMF relations has now had five stages. 
Until 1974 Tanzania had not drawn on Fund facilities, albeit it had 
used (and partially reconstituted some Special Drawing Rights - SDRs) 
Relations with Fund country report missions (which visit all 
members every two or three years) were good partly because any 
dialogue was a free exchange not conditioned by. potential Fund 
sanctions. Over 1974-1975 Tanzania used its Gold and First Credit 
Tranche and drew heavily on the Oil and Compensatory Facilities.
*This article is based on data and statements which have been made 
public in scattered, and in some cases hard to trace, speeches ana 
releases. It is not based on data available to the author as a 
Tanzania Treasury consultant and is in no way an official Treasury 
record or statement of position.
As all were 'low conditionality1 facilities and Tanzania
was clearly both hard hit by exogenous events (drought, oil price,
grain price) little divergence of views arose.
Over 1976-1977 a. draft Standby Agreement was negotiated but never 
implemented. Tanzania believed its credit ceilings did not 
take world inflation into account adequately and would prevent 
recovery of production. The debate petered out because the 
coffee boom removed Tanzania's need to draw.
With the collapse of the coffee boom - and the imprudently 
extensive 1978 import liberalization partly made on IMF/World 
Bank advice - round four opened with Tanzania seeking to 
redraw the partially repaid First Credit Tranche and secure 
additional (soft) Trust Fund Credits. Distinct differences 
of opinion surfaced with the Fund apparently pushing for 25% 
devaluation and sustained import levels while Tanzania saw the former 
as both inflationary and bad for income distribution and the 
latter as unsustainable.
The Amin invasion and the beginning of the 1979-80 oil price 
explosion worsened Tanzania's position. A modest devaluation 
early in 1979 led to modest facilities but a March 1979 proposed 
Standby Agreement was never agreed. Negotiations continued 
through October when an IMF team's presentation of their proposed 
conditions for a major standby agreement led to a dramatic and 
acrimonious breakdown.
Crisis to Accommodation
Following the breakdown it is known that President Nyerere 
essed a letter to the Managing Director of the Fund and 
^^^^-VGd^a^reply in rather placatory terms, both denying that________
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the Fund had ideological biases or political motivations 
and suggesting- that either proposals had been misinterpreted 
as conditions or the Fund officials had exceeded their brief.
(An almost complete change of personnel on both sides distanced 
the 1980 negotiations from the 1979 debacle.) A series of 
communications and discussions ensued leading to a reopening 
of negotiations in May, completion of negotiations in August 
and IMF Board approval in September.
The IMF found itself in a somewhat more difficult position than 
in many negotiations. Its reputation as the unreformed Scrouge 
clearly disturbed it as did the open breakdown of talks with 
both Tanzania and Jamaica. Further both UNDP’s Dell Report and 
the Brandt Commission Report had been highly critical of its 
criteria, procedures and lack of sensitivity. Finally 
Tanzanian Finance Minister Jamal was Chairman for the upcoming 
1980 Annual Joint Meeting of the Boards of Governors of the 
Fund and Bank.
Tanzania's position was also difficult - draconian 
foreign exchange allocation cuts had drastically reduced 
manufacturing output and hampered almost every production and 
service sector. Despite the cuts,arrears on commercial payments 
had risen to approach £100 m. and substantial repayments of 
earlier IMF drawings would fal/ due in 1980/81. While by May 
Tanzania had shown it could hold out for a time without IMF 
facilities and had raised substantial balance of payments support 
finance,the external balance position was only too obviously untenable
Points at Issue
The 1979 breakdown - judging by the President's statement and standard
IMF terms - turned on eight points. Prior devaluation
(25% asked, Tanzania convinced any devaluation at that stage
would worsen matters). Substitution of (higher) interest rates
for credit budgeting. Reduction of constant price recurrent
expenditure (apparently especially on health arid education) .
Reduction of real wages by a continued wage freeze. Liberalisation
of import controls allowing in more imports on a less selective
basis. Dismantling of price controls. Improvement of
economic efficiency (a difference on definition and method with
the Fund emphasizing 'free market' and consumption reduction approaches
Whatever the Fund intended, the proposals would have meant.
dismantling planning and repudiating the strategy of
transition to socialism. They would also have worsened income
distribution, worsened the trade deficit by more than the Fund
credit provided, accelerated inflation, increased inequality
of income distribution and reduced marketed food production -
hardly a recipe for economic recovery even in orthodox
capitalist terms.
1980 Programme
The outcome of the 1980 negotiations on these points can be
deduced partly from press statements but more from what
Tanzania has and has not done. Tanzania has neither
devalued nor stated any intent to do so as opposed to reviewing its
exchange rate policy and practice. The 1980-81 Budget
was largely determined before any of the IMF negotiations and
voted before the final round. The Budget is tight and .
includes tax measures to reduce the Recurrent deficit from
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Sh 1,650 m. to under Sh 350 m. but these are in accord
with the fiscal prudence which has always characterised the present
Minister of Finance. Social services are notably not cut.
Credit allocation has clearly not been ended - September 1980 
reports from firms were that it had been tightened. Nor have 
major interest rate changes been announced or suggested as 
opposed to a Bank of Tanzania study to tidy up the structure of 
rates mentioned by the Governor of the Bank in April. Price controls 
have not been dismantled, indeed their importance was underlined 
in the Budget Speech and by new enforcement efforts (notably 
at Mwanza) in the third quarter of 1980. Import budgeting 
and licence allocation remains central to planning and the somewhat 
larger allocations in 1980«appear keyed to additional resources 
secured and the need to ease production and transport bottlenecks, 
not any philosophical change.
Efficiency measures have indeed been taken - e.g., an overhaul 
of agricultural prices, a restructuring-of consumer grain prices, 
a working group to decentralise and restructure NMC, first 
steps toward an export development strategy. But all these have 
had Tanzanian advocates, been based on Tanzanian studies and 
were begun before May. They may have impressed the IMF - 
they can hardly be viewed as imposed by it. On wages the IMF 
rffiniaIs were met on arrival by headlines announcing a 26% urban 
(36% rural) minimum wage increase. Again, while the nil salary 
increase may have met with their approval it can hardly be seen 
as inconsistent with past Tanzanian policy.
What the agreement certain-ly involves are quarterly ceilings
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government borrowing from the banking system, for total bank 
lending and for external payment arrears. Given the timing 
of the final negotiations these must be based on the 
1980-81 Tanzania Budget, Credit Plan and Foreign Exchange Plan 
largely agreed in April. They cannot as targets- deviate 
significantly from these wholly Tanzanian exercises.
However, in practice two complications clearly do arise:
are
1. IMF ceilings cannot be broken or drawings/halted. Therefore, 
a Tanzania target which could be eased if external events 
went wrong becomes a much more rigid and dangerous
limit when converted into an IMF 'trigger clause1 set on 
single number not a range;
2. Tanzania's budgeting is annual whereas IMF ceilings are 
quarterly. Because Tanzania has pronounced, but rather 
erratic, seasonal patterns in bank lending, government cash 
flow and foreign exchange inflows^, it is likely that
IMF ceilings for the September and 'December quarters 
could pose problems even were the yearly targets met.
In the event the September 1980 quarterly ceilings have apparentl 
been met.
Resource and Use Parameters
The total facilities negotiated are of the order of £100 million.
Of this.about £9 million is Compensatory Facility (export 
shortfalls) and £91 million (£46 million 1980/81 and £45 million 
1981/82) Higher Credit Tranches and Supplementary Financing 
.HiL-uereen) Facility. Of the £55 million available in 1980/81 
(£32 million by the end of 1980) about 1/3 is likely to be
used together with allocations within the basic foreign exchange 
plan to reduce external arrears. Slightly under 1/3 is likely 
to be used to meet 1980/81 repayments of late 1970's IMF 
drawings. About 35-40% (£20-22 million or Sh 400-450 million) 
will be available for additional imports i.e., a 4% boost.
While the net direct import gain is small, the arrears needed to 
be reduced to avoid crippling surcharges on prices quoted to 
Tanzanian importers while default on IMF repayments could not 
be allowed because of its repercussions on other sources of 
finance (especially but not only the World Bank).
Truce or First Step to Agreement?
Tanzania evidently views the 1980 outcome as a truce or ah interim 
arrangement not a real resolution of differences. In the middle of 
the 1980 negotiations it hosted the South-North Conference on 
the International Monetary System at Arusha whose 'Arusha 
Initiative' (Development Dialogue, 1980-2) is sharply critical 
of the Fund and proposes major interim changes plus a longer 
term total reconstruction.
In his Chairman's address to the IMF-Fund Governors Minister 
Jamal argued:
1. change in Fund policies had come; but slowly, grudgingly and 
marginally;
2. three to five year repayment whether the crisis requiring the 
• drawing has passed or not is unreasonably burdensome;
3. new, low conditionality facilities - e.g., to meet 
emergency food imports - are needed at once;
4. the overall philosophy of the-international monetary system 
and of the Fund is attuned to short term cyclical fluctuation
of flexible,, capitalist industrial economies. Global 
crises, external shock adjustment processes, structural 
adjustment and development deficits cannot be fitted into 
that philosophy;
5. therefore,not only new facilities and flexibility of
procedures now,but also a basic structural adjustment of the 
IMF in the next few years is urgently needed.
To project 1981/82 Tanzania/IMF relations is not easy. In the first 
place oil price and supply questions weather global inflation rates 
or grain prices and export prices could make the 1980/81 
quarterly targets unattainable.Whether the IMF will renegotiate 
on a rolling basis remairis to be seen - it has in some (not all) 
other agreements, e.g., those of Kenya and Zambia. If Tanzania
v
meets the 1980/81 quarterly targets, negotiating the 1981/82 set 
is likely to prove workable but perhaps difficult - Tanzania stresses 
raising output to close demand/supply gaps and the Fund cutting 
demand. The basic problem may still be the exchange rate - 
it is unlikely that any Tanzanian analysis would find a 1982 
devaluation to have more positive than negative political 
economic results but it is quite likely that any Fund analysis 
(treating reduction in real wages and price increases as either 
irrelevant or good in themselves and assuming no government 
spending to reduce the impact on the mos^ vulnerable groups) would 
reach the opposite conclusion. Whether such a disagreement will 
lead to another clash, an agreement to disagree without any 
urther credit or an agreement to disagree and release of the 
second half of the Standby is at present an open question.
